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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Debra Haybarger appeals the District Court‟s decision 
granting summary judgment to William Mancino on her 
claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 
29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.  Haybarger contends that the District 
Court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, Mancino was 
not her “employer” under the FMLA.  As a threshold matter, 
we hold on an issue of first impression in our Court that a 
supervisor in a public agency may be subject to individual 
liability under the FMLA.  We further hold that there exists a 
genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Mancino 
is himself subject to such liability.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate and remand the matter to the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
 In 1988, Debra Haybarger began working as an office 
manager for Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole 
(“Lawrence County Probation”), an agency of the Lawrence 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Beginning in 2001, her 
supervisor was William Mancino, the Director of Probation 
and Parole.  Mancino reported to Michael Occhibone, the 
court administrator, who reported to Judge Dominick Motto, 
the President Judge of the Lawrence County Court of 
Common Pleas.   
 
Haybarger has Type II diabetes, heart disease, and 
kidney problems, which forced her to miss work frequently to 
seek medical attention.  Haybarger testified that Mancino 
expressed dissatisfaction with her absences despite 
recognizing that they were due to illness.  Most notably, 
Mancino repeatedly wrote in his annual performance 
evaluations that Haybarger needed “[t]o improve her overall 
health and cut down on the days that she misses due to 
illness.”  (A. 73, 78.)  She also testified that he asked her why 
she breathed heavily and why she needed to visit the doctor 
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so often, and advised her that she needed to “start taking 
better care of [her]self.”  (A. 135.) 
 
On March 23, 2004, Mancino formally disciplined 
Haybarger by placing her on a six-month probationary period 
that required weekly informal progress assessments and 
monthly formal meetings.  Mancino alleged in his discipline 
letter that Haybarger‟s “conduct, work ethic[,] and behavior 
[were] non-conducive to the Adult Probation Office.”  (A. 
92.)  He further alleged that she demonstrated a “lack of 
leadership,” “no clear understanding of the subordinate 
positions” that she supervised, and “a lack[] [of] empathy to 
subordinate workers.”  (A. 92.)  Mancino testified during his 
deposition that he consulted with Occhibone before issuing 
the discipline letter, but that he had the independent authority 
to issue the letter on his own and did not require Occhibone‟s 
approval.  
 
Approximately six months later, Mancino informed 
Occhibone and Judge Motto that Haybarger‟s job 
performance had not improved since he disciplined her in 
March 2004.  Mancino claims that he did not have authority 
to terminate Haybarger‟s employment, but he admits that he 
advised Judge Motto to dismiss her.  Further, he wrote in a 
summary of Haybarger‟s dismissal to Lawrence County 
Probation‟s Human Resources department (“Human 
Resources”) that after two meetings with Occhibone 
concerning Haybarger‟s performance, he “told [Occhibone] 
that [he] had decided that [he] had no other alternative at this 
time but to terminate her employment.”  (A. 96.)  According 
to Occhibone, Judge Motto agreed with Mancino‟s 
recommendation, believing “that Mr. Mancino took all 
measures to help Ms. Haybarger retain employment and that 
unfortunately . . . termination was necessary.”  (A. 98.)  
Accordingly, Mancino wrote in his summary to Human 
Resources that Judge Motto “permitted [him] to terminate 
her.”  (A. 96.) 
 
Mancino, Occhibone, and Judge Motto informed 
Haybarger of her termination at a meeting in the courthouse 
on October 4, 2004.  Additionally, Mancino wrote 
Haybarger‟s termination letter on the same date, stating that 
“[u]pon final review of your probationary period, I feel that 
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no progress or [sic] has been made by you, further, that you 
are incapable of performing at the level necessary to complete 
your assigned duties as the Office Manager in my office.”  
(A. 99.)  He further stated that “[a]fter conferring with the 
District Court Administrator, Michael Occhibone, and the 
President Judge, Dominick Motto, we are in agreement that 
your termination . . . is necessary and in the best interest of 
the overall operations of the Adult Probation Office.”  (A. 
99.)   
 
Haybarger sued Lawrence County Probation, the 
County of Lawrence, and Mancino under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”), 43 Pa. 
Const. Stat. § 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et 
seq., and the FMLA.  On March 14, 2007, the District Court 
dismissed all of Haybarger‟s claims against the County of 
Lawrence; Haybarger‟s ADA, FMLA, and PHRA claims 
against Lawrence County Probation; Haybarger‟s FMLA 
claims against Mancino in his official capacity; and 
Haybarger‟s ADA claim against Mancino in both his 
individual and official capacities.  There thus remained 
pending the Rehabilitation Act claim against Lawrence 
County Probation and the FMLA and PHRA claims against 
Mancino in his individual capacity. 
 
After limited discovery, Lawrence County Probation 
moved for summary judgment based on the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The District Court denied Lawrence County 
Probation‟s motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed.  
See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 
F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
On remand, Lawrence County Probation moved for 
summary judgment on Haybarger‟s Rehabilitation Act claim, 
and Mancino moved for summary judgment on Haybarger‟s 
FMLA claim.
1
  The District Court denied summary judgment 
on Haybarger‟s Rehabilitation Act claim, and Lawrence 
County Probation and Haybarger subsequently settled the 
Rehabilitation Act claim.   
                                              
 
1
 Haybarger conceded that she cannot present a viable 
PHRA claim against Mancino. 
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As to the FMLA claim against Mancino in his 
individual capacity, the District Court held that, while the 
FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at 
public agencies, Haybarger failed to present sufficient 
evidence to hold Mancino liable.  The District Court reasoned 
that an individual supervisor is an “employer” for FMLA 
purposes only if he or she has “sufficient control over the 
[employee‟s] conditions and terms of employment.”  
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, No. 06-
862, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421, at *27 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 
2010) (quoting Kilvitis v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 
403, 413 (M.D. Pa. 1999)).  The District Court then stated 
that an employer has adequate control if he or she “has the 
authority to hire and fire.”  Id. (quoting Narodetsky v. 
Cardone Indus., No. 09-4734, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16133, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)).  Because Mancino lacked 
final authority to fire Haybarger, the District Court concluded 
that Mancino did not have sufficient control over Haybarger‟s 
employment for liability to attach and granted Mancino‟s 
motion for summary judgment.  Haybarger filed her instant 
appeal, contending that a genuine dispute of material fact 
remains concerning whether Mancino was her employer 
under the FMLA. 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
  We 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction to consider only final orders 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Except in limited circumstances, we 
“will not entertain an appeal unless the district court‟s order 
„ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for 
the court to do but execute the judgment.‟”  Bethel v. 
McAllister Bros., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 867 
(1994)) (citations omitted).  A district court order dismissing 
without prejudice is usually not a final order.  See Borelli v. 
City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam).  The District Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Mancino on Haybarger‟s FMLA claim on July 14, 
2010.  Still pending at that time was Haybarger‟s 
Rehabilitation Act claim against Lawrence County Probation.  
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exercise plenary review over district court decisions granting 
summary judgment.  See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 
206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when the movant demonstrates that there is no 
“genuine dispute as to any material fact.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  A material fact is “[a] fact[] that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  For an issue 
to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence 
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a 
jury or judge to resolve the parties‟ differing versions of the 
truth at trial.”  Id. at 248-49 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. 
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).   
 
III. 
 
Although Haybarger challenges only the District 
Court‟s holding that Mancino was not her employer under the 
FMLA, and Mancino concedes in his brief that supervisors at 
public agencies are subject to liability under the FMLA, we 
have not yet decided whether supervisors at public agencies 
are subject to liability under the FMLA.  Because we 
necessarily must decide whether supervisors at public 
agencies are subject to liability before determining whether 
the District Court erred in holding that Mancino was not 
Haybarger‟s employer, we first address whether the FMLA 
permits individual liability against supervisors at public 
agencies.
3
  We then consider whether the District Court erred 
                                                                                                     
After being notified of the settlement of the Rehabilitation 
Act claim against Lawrence County Probation, the District 
Court entered an order dismissing the action without 
prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
Because the District Court dismissed without prejudice, we 
originally lacked jurisdiction.  However, the District Court 
amended its order on November 1, 2011, directing dismissal 
with prejudice.  Accordingly, we now have jurisdiction.  See 
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 
1983) (a non-final order that becomes final before disposition 
on the merits by the Court of Appeals confers jurisdiction). 
 
3
 We ordinarily do not address issues that the parties 
have not briefed.  See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of 
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in holding that Mancino was not an employer under the 
FMLA. 
 
A. 
 
We look first to the FMLA‟s language to ascertain 
whether Congress intended to permit individual liability 
under the FMLA.  See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 
(1991) (analyzing congressional intent to hold that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 permits suits against officers in their personal 
capacity).  The FMLA defines an “employer” as follows: 
 
(A) In general. The term 
“employer”-- 
         (i) means any person 
engaged in commerce or in any 
industry or activity affecting 
commerce who employs 50 or 
                                                                                                     
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 158 n.15 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 151 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2001)).  However, we “retain[] the independent power to 
identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”  
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (citing 
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)).  We 
thus “may consider an issue „antecedent to . . . and ultimately 
dispositive of‟ the dispute before [us], even an issue the 
parties fail[ed] to identify and brief.”  U.S. Nat’l Bank v. 
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (quoting 
Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 77); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
U.S. 83, 87 (1953) (federal courts are “not bound to accept [a 
party‟s] concession”).  The Supreme Court has cautioned that 
“[t]he contrary conclusion would permit litigants, by agreeing 
on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court . 
. . that would be difficult to characterize as anything but 
advisory.”  U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 447.  Because we 
have not yet decided whether individual liability against a 
supervisor at a public agency is available under the FMLA, 
we risk rendering an advisory opinion if we address whether 
Mancino is an employer under the FMLA without first 
analyzing whether the FMLA permits individual liability.  
Accordingly, we first determine whether the FMLA permits 
individual liability in the public agency context. 
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more employees for each working 
day during each of 20 or more 
calendar workweeks in the current 
or preceding calendar year; 
         (ii) includes-- 
            (I) any person who acts, 
directly or indirectly, in the 
interest of an employer to any of 
the employees of such employer; 
and 
            (II) any successor in 
interest of an employer; 
         (iii) includes any “public 
agency”, as defined in section 
3(x) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(x)); 
and 
         (iv) includes the General 
Accounting Office [Government 
Accountability Office] and the 
Library of Congress. 
  
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added).   
 
 Section 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)‟s inclusion of “any person 
who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an 
employer” plainly contemplates that liability for FMLA 
violations may be imposed upon an individual person who 
would not otherwise be regarded as the plaintiff‟s 
“employer.”  Indeed, otherwise, § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) adds 
nothing to § 2611(4)(A)(i)‟s definition of an employer as 
“any person . . . who employs 50 or more employees.”  See 
Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) “plainly includes persons other than 
the employer itself”).   
 
The Department of Labor‟s implementing regulations 
for the FMLA confirm that the FMLA permits individual 
liability.  The regulations state that “[e]mployers . . . include 
any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a 
covered employer to any of the employees of the employer, 
any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any 
public agency.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a).  The regulations 
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then explicitly provide that “individuals such as corporate 
officers „acting in the interest of an employer‟ are 
individually liable for any violations of the requirements of 
FMLA.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d).  In promulgating the 
regulations, the Department of Labor responded to concerns 
of imposing individual liability under the FMLA by noting 
that the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 
et seq., which defines “employer” similarly to the FMLA, 
already holds “corporate officers, managers and supervisors 
acting in the interest of an employer . . . individually liable.” 4  
Summary of Major Comments for the FMLA Regulations, 60 
Fed. Reg. 2180, 2181 (Jan. 6, 1995) (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, the FMLA regulations leave little doubt that 
individual liability is available under the FMLA.
5
 
 
As recognized in Modica v. Taylor, “that Congress, in 
drafting the FMLA, chose to make the definition of 
„employer‟ materially identical to that in the FLSA means 
that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance 
for construing the term „employer‟ as it is used in the 
FMLA.”  465 F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999)).  We 
held under the FLSA that a real estate management company 
acting as agent for various building owners is an “employer” 
of persons whose wages were paid by the owners.  Hodgson 
v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 1971), 
rev’d on other grounds, 410 U.S. 512 (1973).  In Hodgson v. 
Arnheim & Neely, Inc., a real estate management company 
                                              
 
4
 Much as under the FMLA, the FLSA defines an 
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer in relation to an employee and 
includes a public agency.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 
 
5
 Congress vested the Secretary of Labor with 
authority to promulgate regulations to implement the FMLA 
under 29 U.S.C. § 2654.  See Sommer v. Vanguard Grp., 461 
F.3d 397, 399 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006).  We give “controlling 
weight” to the Secretary of Labor‟s regulations under the 
FMLA “unless [the regulations] are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. (quoting Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984)). 
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operated eight office buildings and one apartment complex 
under a management contract.  Id. at 610.  The management 
company collected rent for each building and deposited the 
collections in a separate bank account for each building.  Id.  
The expenses for each building were paid from the bank 
account established for that building.  Id.  The real estate 
management company had the authority to hire and to 
supervise each building‟s maintenance employees.  Id.  
Although the real estate management company exercised 
substantial control over employment practices, it lacked 
complete authority because the building owners maintained 
the right to review hiring practices.  Id. at 611.  We held that, 
despite the building owners‟ right to review employment 
practices, the real estate management company was an 
employer under the FLSA because it “act[ed] . . . in the 
interest of an employer.”  Id. at 612 (citations omitted).  We 
noted that the FLSA “contemplates the possibility of several 
simultaneous „employers[,]‟ any one of which may be liable 
as an employer under the Act.”  Id. at 611-12.   
 
Much as a real estate management company acts as an 
agent for building owners, supervisors act as agents for their 
employers.  Although a supervisor may not have ultimate 
authority over employment practices, we held in Hodgson 
that a higher decisionmaker‟s ultimate authority does not 
relieve lower decisionmakers from liability.  Accordingly, we 
recognize today that, just as a real estate management 
company acting as an agent for building owners may be liable 
as an employer under the FLSA, an individual supervisor 
working for an employer may be liable as an employer under 
the FMLA.
6
 
                                              
6
 Several district courts have concluded that the FMLA 
does not allow individual liability by comparing the FMLA to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
et seq., instead of to the FLSA.  See, e.g., Frizzell v. Sw. 
Motor Freight, 906 F. Supp. 441, 449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 641 
(6th Cir. 1998); Carter v. Rental Unif. Serv., 977 F. Supp. 
753, 759 (W.D. Va. 1997).  Title VII defines an “employer” 
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce  . . . 
and any agent of such a person.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  Title 
VII‟s definition of an employer is much narrower than the 
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Furthermore, we discern no reason to distinguish 
between public agencies and private employers under the 
FMLA insofar as individual liability is concerned.  Under § 
2611(4)(A)(iii), an employer includes “any „public agency.‟”  
As we discussed supra, the FMLA‟s regulations provide that 
“[e]mployers . . . include any person acting, directly or 
indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the 
employees of the employer, any successor in interest of a 
covered employer, and any public agency.”  29 C.F.R. § 
825.104(a).  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have already 
recognized that the FMLA‟s inclusion of public agencies in 
both its statutory language and its regulations demonstrates 
that individual supervisors at public agencies are subject to 
liability.  See Modica, 465 F.3d at 184; Darby, 287 F.3d at 
681.  District courts within our own circuit have reached the 
same conclusion.  See, e.g., Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 415; 
Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 
(D.N.J. 2006); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 
429, 477 (W.D. Pa. 2008).   
 
 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, however, do not 
permit individual liability against supervisors at public 
agencies.  See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686.  The Sixth Circuit 
reasons that the FMLA does not permit individual liability 
because the FMLA‟s individual liability provision does not 
refer to the FMLA‟s public agency provision.  See Mitchell, 
343 F.3d at 829.  The Sixth Circuit construes the FMLA as 
containing four modifiers of the meaning of “employer” in § 
2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv).  Id. at 829.  According to the Sixth 
Circuit, the modifiers in § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv) each relate to 
the term “employer,” but they do not relate to each other 
because “the plain text[] separat[es] . . . the clauses into 
distinct provisions.”  Id. at 830.  The second modifier 
provides that “[a]n employer includes any person who acts 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer,” while the 
                                                                                                     
FMLA‟s and the FLSA‟s definition of an employer as any 
person acting “directly or indirectly, in the interest of an 
employer” in relation to an employee.  Because Title VII 
defines an employer more narrowly than the FMLA and the 
FLSA, decisions construing Title VII do not provide a 
persuasive source of authority. 
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third modifier provides that “[a]n employer includes any 
„public agency‟ as that term is defined in the FLSA.”  Id. at 
829 (citing § 2611(4)(A)(ii)-(iii)).  Because the Sixth Circuit 
does not believe that the individual liability provision in the 
second modifier relates to the public agency provision in the 
third modifier, the Sixth Circuit holds that individual liability 
is not available against supervisors at public agencies.  Id. at 
830. 
 
 The Sixth Circuit indicates that interpreting the 
modifiers as relating to each other results in redundancies, 
noting most importantly that § 2611(4)(B) states that “a 
public agency shall be considered to be a person engaged in 
commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce.”  
Id. at 831.  It reasons that § 2611(4)(B) is superfluous if the 
first modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(i), defining an employer as 
“any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or 
activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more 
employees,” relates to the third modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(iii), 
stating that employers include public agencies.  Id.  Further, 
the Sixth Circuit adds that the FMLA‟s regulations provide 
that a public agency is exempt from § 2611(4)(A)(i)‟s “50 or 
more employees” requirement, demonstrating that the first 
modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(i) does not relate to the third 
modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(iii).  Id. 
 
 Finally, the Sixth Circuit reasons that combining § 
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)‟s individual liability provision with § 
2611(4)(A)(iii)‟s public agency provision results in a 
definition of “employer” that is nearly the same as the 
FLSA‟s definition of “employer.”  Id.  Because the FMLA 
ordinarily refers to the FLSA when it adopts a definition 
found in the FLSA, the Sixth Circuit holds that it is unlikely 
that Congress intended to create the same definition of an 
“employer” in the FMLA as in the FLSA.  Id.  Accordingly, 
the Sixth Circuit concludes that the FMLA distinguishes 
between public agencies and private employers and does not 
make individuals at public agencies liable for FMLA 
violations.
7
  Id. at 832. 
                                              
7
 The Eleventh Circuit holds that a public official sued 
in his or her individual capacity is not liable under the FMLA 
because an individual officer lacks sufficient control over an 
 13 
 
 
 Although the Sixth Circuit highlights several 
ambiguities in the FMLA, we agree with the Fifth Circuit‟s 
analysis in Modica.  See 465 F.3d at 184-85.  First, as the 
Fifth Circuit observes, the FMLA indicates a relationship 
between § 2611(4)(A)‟s modifiers by stating that the term 
“employer” “means” its definition in § 2611(4)(A)(i) and then 
“includes” the provisions in § 2611(4)(A)(ii)-(iv).  Id. at 185.  
Therefore, an “employer” “means any person engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce 
who employs 50 or more employees” and “includes” both 
“any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of 
an employer” and public agencies.  Id.  Because the definition 
of “employer” includes public agencies, and Congress 
provided that an employer may include individuals, it plainly 
follows that an individual supervisor at a public agency may 
be subject to liability.  Id.   
 
 Next, as the Fifth Circuit notes, § 2611(4)(B)‟s “public 
agency” provision is not superfluous when we interpret § 
2611(4)(A)(iii)‟s inclusion of public agencies as relating to § 
2611(4)(A)(i)‟s definition of an employer because § 
2611(4)(B) creates a presumption that public agencies engage 
in commerce.  See Modica, 465 F.3d at 186.  Section 
2611(4)(B) thus “relieves plaintiffs of the burden of proving 
that a public agency is engaged in commerce.”  Id. (citing 
Hewett, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 820). 
 
 Finally, we agree with the Fifth Circuit‟s reasoning 
that the FMLA‟s similarity to the FLSA indicates that 
Congress intended for courts to treat the FMLA the same as 
the FLSA, rather than treating only specific provisions alike.  
See id.  Because the FLSA explicitly provides that an 
employer includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in 
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and 
                                                                                                     
employee‟s employment.  See Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 
683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999).  Although we agree that an officer 
must have control over the terms and conditions of an 
employee‟s employment to be liable under the FMLA, we 
reject a blanket rule that a public official in his or her 
individual capacity never has the requisite control to be an 
employer, as we explain in Section III(B) infra. 
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includes a public agency,” we agree that the FMLA similarly 
permits individual liability against supervisors at public 
agencies.  Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). 
 
B. 
 
 Having concluded that an individual supervisor at a 
public agency may be held liable under the FMLA, we must 
next determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of 
material fact concerning whether Mancino was Haybarger‟s 
employer under the FMLA.  We return to the FMLA‟s 
statutory language, which states that an “employer” includes 
“any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of 
an employer to any of the employees of such employer.”  § 
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I).  We believe this language means that an 
individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she 
exercises “supervisory authority over the complaining 
employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged 
violation” while acting in the employer‟s interest.  Riordan v. 
Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing 
individual liability under the FLSA‟s analogous definition of 
an “employer”).  As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting 
the FLSA‟s analogous employer provision, an individual 
supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining 
employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] 
control over the work situation.”  Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 
747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Donovan v. 
Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1983)); see 
also Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (holding that 
a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and 
conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer 
under the FLSA). 
 
 In analyzing an individual supervisor‟s control over 
the employee under the FLSA and the FMLA, most courts 
look to the “economic reality” of the employment situation, 
examining whether the individual supervisor carried out the 
functions of an employer with respect to the employee.
8
  See, 
                                              
8
 The “economic reality” test is a broad test for 
determining whether an employment relationship exists, and 
is not limited to evaluating whether a supervisor is an 
employer for purposes of individual liability.  In 1944, the 
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e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(analyzing the economic reality to determine whether an 
individual is subject to liability under the FLSA); Herman v. 
RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); 
Donovan, 747 F.2d at 972 (same); Dep’t of Labor v. Cole 
Enters., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Mason v. 
Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 774 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (discussing economic reality in the context of 
individual liability under the FMLA); Smith v. Westchester 
Cnty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(applying the economic reality test to determine whether an 
individual is liable under the FMLA).  As we recognized in 
applying the economic reality test in the context of the FLSA, 
whether a person functions as an employer depends on the 
totality of the circumstances rather than on “technical 
concepts of the employment relationship.”  Hodgson, 444 
F.2d at 612. 
 
 The Second Circuit held that some of the relevant 
factors in ascertaining the economic reality of the 
employment situation include whether the individual “(1) had 
the power to hire and fire the employee[], (2) supervised and 
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of 
employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, 
and (4) maintained employment records.”  Herman, 172 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
Supreme Court first looked to the “underlying economic 
facts” to distinguish between employees and independent 
contractors under the National Labor Relations Act.  NLRB v. 
Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (citing NLRB 
v. Blount, 131 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1942)).  Seventeen years 
later, the Supreme Court looked to the “economic reality” of 
the employment relationship to hold that members of a work 
cooperative qualified as employees under the FLSA.  
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 
(1961) (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 
(1947)) (additional citation omitted).  Since then, we and 
other circuits have applied the economic reality test to decide 
whether entities qualify as employers under the FLSA.  See, 
e.g., Hodgson, 444 F.2d at 612; Baystate Alt. Staffing v. 
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Bonnette v. Cal. 
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 
1983).   
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at 139 (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 
12 (2d Cir. 1984)) (citation omitted).  The Second Circuit 
cautioned, however, that courts must consider “any relevant 
evidence” and “[n]o one of the four factors standing alone is 
dispositive.”9  Id. (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 
331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).   
 
Considering Mancino‟s control over Haybarger‟s 
employment and the economic reality of Haybarger‟s 
employment situation, we believe that Mancino has failed to 
demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and [that he] is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Stated otherwise, we believe a 
rational juror could find that Mancino had sufficient control 
over Haybarger‟s employment so as to be subject to liability 
for a violation of the FMLA that he caused to occur.  
 
As an initial matter, there appears to be no dispute that 
Mancino acted in the interest of Lawrence County Probation 
with respect to Haybarger when he carried out his role as her 
supervisor and recommended that Judge Motto terminate her.  
Indeed, Mancino stated in Haybarger‟s termination letter that 
he was dismissing her because he believed that her dismissal 
was “in the best interest of the [Lawrence County Probation] 
overall operations.”  (A. 99.)   
 
Turning to Mancino‟s control over Haybarger‟s work 
situation, Mancino exercised substantial authority over 
Haybarger‟s termination decision, even if he lacked final 
authority to dismiss her.  Most importantly, Mancino admits 
that he advised Judge Motto to terminate her.  Additionally, 
                                              
9
 The District Court recognized that Mancino‟s control 
over Haybarger‟s employment was critical in determining 
whether he qualified as an employer under the FMLA.  
However, rather than considering the total employment 
situation, the District Court considered only Mancino‟s 
“power to hire and fire.”  Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult 
Prob. & Parole, No. 06-862, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421, 
at *27 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2010) (quoting Narodetsky v. 
Cardone Indus., No. 09-4734, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16133, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)).  We do not agree that power 
to hire and fire is dispositive. 
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Mancino was present at the meeting when Haybarger was 
informed of her termination, and he wrote her termination 
letter, in which he stated, “I feel that no progress or [sic] has 
been made by you . . . [so] [a]fter conferring with the District 
Court Administrator, Michael Occhibone, and the President 
Judge, Dominick Motto, we are in agreement that your 
termination . . . is necessary.”  (A. 99.)  As the Second Circuit 
noted, the fact that an employer‟s “hiring decisions 
occasionally may be subjected to a third party‟s veto” does 
not preclude imposing liability on the employer.  Carter, 735 
F.2d at 12.  Accordingly, a jury could reasonably conclude 
that, but for the substantial authority wielded by Mancino, 
Judge Motto would not have exercised his ultimate authority 
to fire Haybarger.   
 
Additionally, Mancino exercised significant control 
over the conditions of Haybarger‟s employment prior to her 
termination, even if he did not exercise control over every 
aspect.  See Herman, 172 F.3d at 139 (an individual need not 
engage in “continuous monitoring” for liability to attach).  
Mancino supervised Haybarger‟s work, including the 
preparation of her annual performance reviews.  Further, 
Mancino disciplined Haybarger when he was dissatisfied with 
her performance, including by issuing a formal discipline 
letter in March 2004.  Indeed, Mancino concedes that he had 
ultimate authority to discipline Haybarger, requiring no 
approval from his supervisor.  Accordingly, because the 
record suggests that Mancino exercised control over the 
conditions of Haybarger‟s employment, it cannot be 
concluded that no rational jury could find that Mancino 
qualified as Haybarger‟s employer under the FMLA.  We 
therefore do not agree that Mancino is entitled to summary 
judgment.  
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Haybarger‟s FMLA 
claim against William Mancino and remand for further 
proceedings.  
